A three year football banning order under s.14A Football Spectators Act 1989 was not disproportionate as there was ample material to justify the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for believing an order was necessary to prevent violence or disorder.Application by the claimant ('B'), with leave of the single judge, for judicial review of the defendant's decision refusing to state a case of a magistrate's decision on 29 January 2003 imposing a three year football banning order under s.14A Football Spectators Act 1989. B pleaded guilty to an offence of offering for sale a ticket for a designated football match contrary to s.166(1) and (3) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. B offered a ticket to plain clothes police officers for ?100. He was arrested and when searched was found to have £426 in cash on him. B applied for judicial review of the decision imposing the ban on the grounds that: (i) relying on Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Police (2002) QB 1213, it was necessary to read into s.14A of the 1989 Act the provisions of s.14B(2), whereby a person had to have caused or contributed to violent disorder, and once incorporated the test in s.14A and 14B(4)(b) was the same; and (ii) the imposition of a three year banning order was unreasonable or disproportionate to the sale of one ticket.HELD: (1) The construction point was quite unarguable. It was significant that in s.14A of the 1989 Act, unlike s.14B, there was no reference to a person having at any time caused or contributed to violence. The regime under s.14A was clearly and expressly different. The purpose of a banning order, under s.14A, following conviction of an offence was to contribute to the prevention of a breach of peace as an ancillary order to any other punishment. (2) There was nothing disproportionate in the making of the order. B was selling not only a ticket to a police officer but was in a position to immediately gain access to the source of such tickets. The cash found on B, in the absence of any other explanation, was indicative of earlier similar activities. There was therefore ample material to justify the defendant reaching the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for believing the order would help to prevent violence or disorder.Application dismissed.
 EWHC 3194 (Admin)