Justice for sale - transforming criminal justice

Parliament had not intended, by enacting the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 art.61(8B), that a failure by the secretary of state to authorise an electronic fingerprinting device for use meant that any fingerprint evidence obtained as a result of using of such a device was automatically inadmissible.

The crown court had jurisdiction to order reporting restrictions under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.46 where the name of a witness was common knowledge but publication of photographs of her and her children would have led to her identification which would have affected the quality of her evidence at trial.

Any practice of not disclosing the details of alibi witnesses to the prosecution until they had provided signed proofs of evidence was wrong and breached the requirements of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 s.6A(2)(a). However, the view that details should not be disclosed had been widely held; a firm of solicitors' failure to disclose had not been improper or unreasonable so as to justify a wasted costs order against them.

A sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for rape was reduced to 10 and a half years where the sentencing judge had failed to have sufficient regard to the unusual circumstances of the offence, in particular the effect upon the offender and the complainant, his former partner, of the death of their child.

Credit for a guilty plea was to reflect savings to the public purse and the avoidance of requiring complainants to give evidence and be cross-examined; it was not to be given solely for showing remorse.

There was no "closest fit" principle in deciding between the various pre-emptive orders available to control violence; provided the statutory conditions were met, it was at the judge's discretion.

Where the character of a joint criminal enterprise was such that it was foreseeable that a party to the enterprise could be subject to unusual or increased risks of harm as a consequence of the pursuit of those criminal activities, any resulting injury could properly be said to be caused by the claimant's criminal act even if it resulted from the negligent or intentional act of another party to the illegal enterprise.

The court clarified the correct approach to sentencing for the most serious offences of conspiracy to defraud.

The sentencing guidelines on drugs offences applied to offences involving the supply of drugs which were charged as a conspiracy. Conspiracies involving street dealing were not intended to be restricted to category 3, in which the starting point was not based on quantity; categories of offence were to be assessed in relation to the harm done, which was itself reflective of the amount of the drug put into circulation.

A sentence of 30 months' imprisonment, imposed following a guilty plea to arson being reckless as to whether life was endangered, was not manifestly excessive for an offender who was not of good character and who had ben drinking to excess, whose principal mitigation was his suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

A minimum term of 12 years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive for an offence of murder. The offender had not had a legitimate expectation that his tariff would be set at the level recommended by the trial judge, since the High Court had set the minimum term in accordance with the requirements of The Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.22.

Sentences of three or four years' imprisonment respectively, according to age, were imposed on youths who had attacked and robbed as a group were not manifestly excessive. However, in the case of one, who had inadvertently been sentenced to a detention and training order when he was 14 years old and who did not meet the criteria for detention under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.91, a youth rehabilitation order for 12 months would be substituted.

A total sentence of three years' imprisonment imposed following pleas of guilty to 15 offences of fraud and two of theft was reduced to two years. The defendant had stolen from her own children, in breach of trust, over a significant period of time, but there had been no good reason to increase the sentence above the starting point of three years for offences which fell into the most serious category specified in the sentencing guidelines for thefts in breach of trust.

A judge had been entitled to reject a submission of no case to answer on the basis of the circumstantial evidence linking a defendant to an attempt to smuggle cocaine into the United Kingdom.

The fact that the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, acting on police advice, had accepted that owners of properties in a sectarian interface area were entitled to "intimidation points" under its Housing Selection Scheme did not mean that the requirements for the issue of a chief constable's certificate under the separate Scheme for the Purchase of Evacuated Dwellings had been met.

An offender found in possession of clothes left out in bags for charity had been properly convicted of handling stolen goods. It was not necessary to prove that the goods belonged to the organisation named on the bags, but by putting the clothes into the bags the householders had completed a gift to that organisation by delivery.

It had not been open to a recorder to sentence on the basis of the victim's complaint of rape rather than on the basis of the defendant's guilty plea to sexual activity with a child family member.

A rehabilitation order of 18 months imposed on a young offender for wounding with intent was held to be unduly lenient and was replaced with an 18-month detention and training order.

The Court of Appeal reduced sentences of imprisonment and detention imposed for a planned gang robbery of a vulnerable victim at night using imitation firearms as the judge had set too high a starting point for offenders who were young men of previous good character.